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Descartes on Mindless Animals 
STEPHEN GAUKROGER * 
What is it like to be a dog, or a bat, or an earthwonn? When a 
dog sees someone she recognises, do we have any understanding 
of the cognitive state she is in, and perhaps of her affective or 
emotional state? The obvious way to proceed is to extrapolate 
from our own cognitive and affective states. But if we do that, 
we tend to end up thinking of the cognitive state of the dog as 
being like a diminished version of our own: the dog's cognitive 
state is relatively unfocused, or confused, or whatever, as if 
dogs are like a retarded or especially confused version of human 
beings. The unsatisfactory nature of this proposal has led many 
philosophers to dispute whether or not dogs, for example, can 
be described as being in cognitive states at all. To say they are 
in cognitive states, but not like ours, is to say they are not in 
cognitive states at all, because the 'like ours' is crucial to our 
identifying a cognitive state in the first place. If it were not, then 
we could just as easily say that chairs and tables, or hydrogen 
atoms, are in cognitive states, but not like ours. 
But there are competing considerations that force us to take 
the idea of animal cognitive states seriously. Compare an 
earthwonn, a shark, a dog, a chimpanzee, and a human being. It 
is impossible, on behavioural grounds, to resist the conclusion 
that we have here a series of things with different cognitive 
skills, and that there is an increase in cognitive skill as we proceed 
up the list. And this irresistible conclusion is confirmed when 
we compare the size and anatomical complexity of brain and 
central nervous systems. The reply that we can only call our 
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own cognitive skills cognitive begins to looks like a merely 
semantic point. 
I think there is a genuine dilemma here, and am not sure what 
the right answer is to what we do about it: indeed, I suspect that 
there is no one right answer, but several highly context-dependent 
good answers, depending on what exactly one is asking for. The 
problem is certainly not a new one, although in the early modem 
era parallels between animals and human beings were 
predominantly parallels between their affective states rather than 
between their cognitive states. The idea that different species of 
animals manifested particular passions and/or virtues goes back 
at least to the Patristic writers, and supplied a staple diet of 
iconography for medieval and Renaissance writers and painters. 
Early modem writers go along with this story: 'animals are 
always uniform in all their actions', one anonymous seventeenth-
century writer tells us; 'the Lyon is always generous, the Hare 
ever cowardly; the Tyger, cruel; the Fox, craft' .1 These features 
had an explanatory role. So, for example, Thomas Wright, in his 
Passions of the Minde (1601) introduces eleven basic passions, 
and illustrates them by making reference to the behaviour of 
the sheep and the wolf.2 Cureau de la Cha~bre, one of the most 
influential writers on the passions in the seventeenth century, 
sets out his account of courage in terms of a close investigation 
of the behaviour of lions.3 And so on. 
Note that having a low view of a particular species means 
attributing a disreputable distinctive affective state to it, not 
refusing to attribute an affective state to it at all. No one, as far 
as I have been able to discover, denies affective states to animals, 
Descartes included. Descartes notes that the signs of passions 
in animals are natural and invariant, whereas those in humans 
can be modified by the soul: 'the soul is able to change facial 
expressions', he tells us, 'as well as expressions of the eyes .... 
Thus we may use such expressions to hide our passions as well 
as reveal them'. Animals may not be able to disguise their 
affective states, but they do have them. 
And not only do they have affective states, they have 
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cognItIve states as well, for Descartes. This is my theme: 
Descartes' account of cognition in animals, which he referred 
to at various times as 'betes machines' or 'automata'. Descartes 
has had a bad press on animals. It has been maintained recently 
that Descartes alienated his family by dissecting the family dog 
on the kitchen table,4 confirming a widespread view (or at least 
it would have confirmed a widespread view if it had been true) 
that since Descartes considered animals to be mere machines, 
states such as fear, pain, or anguish could not be attributed to 
them, and so one could treat them as one liked. 
Descartes has been seen primarily as the instigator of 
mind/body dualism, which treats the mind and the body as two 
completely separate substances, which do not admit of degrees. 
Earlier thinkers, and many of Descartes' contemporaries, believed 
that they were able to capture the differences between, say, 
inanimate things, plants, animals, and human beings, by 
postulating various degrees of 'soul'-vegetative, sensible, and 
rational-which often blended into one another, so that there 
was a clear hierarchy in the order of being, as it were. Descartes, 
by contrast, because he only admitted matter and the human 
rational soul, or mind, was left with a sharp divide between 
those entities which have minds-namely human beings-and 
those which have not: inanimate things, plants, animals. Does 
this prevent him from ascribing cognitive states to animals? I 
argue that it does not. 
One of the principal tasks of the seventeenth-century 
mechanist natural philosophy--of which Descartes was one of 
the foremost representatives-was the elimination of teleology. 
In the case of mechanics, optics, and cosmology, there were, 
outside the question of the formation of the Earth, few reasons 
to question this approach once Aristotelianism had been 
abandoned. Physiology was a different matter, however, and 
among the phenomena that a mechanised physiology had to 
deal with were a number of processes that seemed clearly goal-
directed. Here at least, it was not a question of Aristotle's 
misguided concern to provide teleological explanations where 
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they weren't needed, but rather a question of how one could 
possibly avoid reference to goals in explaining these processes. 
I am particularly interested in the resources used by Descartes 
in his development of a mechanist physiology to account for 
two processes that had traditionally been conceived as goal-
directed. The first is his account of the development of the foetus, 
where he pursues a programme designed to show that what had 
traditionally been seen as a goal-directed process need not be 
thought of as goal-directed at all, and could be construed in 
terms of straightforward mechanical causation. The second (my 
present concern) occurs in his treatment of perceptual cognition 
in animals-and in humans in cases where the intellect is not 
operative, that is where it is simply a case of psycho-physiology-
where he does not attempt to show that perceptual cognition 
does not occur, but rather invokes a kind of receptive capacity 
which stretches what one might normally think of as the limits 
of explanations that have recourse only to mechanical causation. 
The aims of a mechanistic physiology 
Before we can appreciate the strengths and limitations of these 
resources, it is important that we ask about the aim of a 
mechanised physiology; that is, what Descartes hoped to achieve 
by such a programme. Descartes' commitment to mechanism 
extends far beyond physiology, and the most important statement 
of his mechanistic physiology, the Traite de I'Homme, is the 
continuation of a work providing a mechanist account of optics 
and cosmology, the Traite de fa Lumiere, also known by the 
generic title Le Monde.5 Le Monde sets out to show how optical 
and cosmological phenomena can be explained in terms of a 
theory of matter and two basic physical principles, centrifugal 
force and the principle of rectilinear inertia. His theory of matter 
allows no qualitative distinction between types of matter, it allows 
no internal forces or activities, and it explains various differences 
between the properties of things in terms of three sizes of matter, 
the largest making up the planets, the second making up fluids 
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such as the air and the regions between the planets, and the 
smallest filling up the regions between the boundaries of the first 
and second kinds, which are generally speaking corpuscular, and 
also making up the sun. The most important feature of Cartesian 
matter from the point of view of mechanism is its inertness. This 
was a constraint the full implications of which Descartes had 
learnt from Mersenne, for it was the versions of mechanism that 
Mersenne was developing in various works in the mid-1620s 
that largely shaped Descartes' understanding of the natural-
philosophical issues underlying mechanism. Mersenne had been 
particularly concerned to rebut various forms of Renaissance 
naturalism, which had obscured the distinction between the natural 
and the supernatural, and had conceived nature generally as 
animate in varying degrees, having numerous powers and forces 
by which natural processes were effected. One particular danger 
that he perceived in the construal of nature as an 'active realm' 
along naturalistic lines was that the need for divine activity would 
ultimately be rendered otiose. Unable to counter these forms of 
naturalism by relying on traditional scholasticism-for the 
Aristotelian doctrine of form was part of the naturalist armoury-
he advocated a strict separation between an active supernatural 
realm and a completely inert natural realm, stripping the latter 
not just of the offending sympathies and powers of the naturalists, 
but also of Aristotelian forms and qualities. 
Descartes employs this notion of matter not only in his 
physical theory, but also in his account of physiology. There are 
three kinds of approach to which his mechanist account can be 
seen as an alternative. These attempt to provide an account of 
physiology that aims to explain various functional differences 
between organs either, first, in terms of qualitatively different 
kinds of matter, or, second, in terms of some non-material 
principle guiding those functions, or, third, in goal-directed terms 
which cannot be captured mechanistically. In the first case, what 
was usually invoked was the traditional doctrine of the four 
elements--earth, air, fire, water-but Descartes had, in Le 
Monde, already questioned both the basis for this doctrine and 
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whether the accounts it produced could have any explanatory 
value, whether they could actually have infonnative content, 
and he had offered his own accounts of phenomena such as 
burning, and the different physical properties of solids and fluids, 
in tenns of his much more economical single matter theory. At a 
general level, the argument is that invoking the traditional theory 
of the elements explains nothing, and the cases they are invoked 
to explain in physical theory can actually be accounted for fully 
in tenns of a single type of matter, material extension. When we 
tum to physiology, the same considerations apply. Why try to 
account for differences in physiological function in tenns of a 
theory of matter which would not explain anything anyway, and 
which can be replaced by something much more economical? 
In the second case, a parallel set of considerations holds. 
Instead of a theory of elements, what are invoked are various 
classes of 'soul': vegetative souls, sensitive souls, and rational 
souls. These are supposed to capture various qualitative 
differences that emerge as we ascend the chain of being from 
inanimate matter, to vegetable life, to animal life, to human 
beings; or alternatively, as we ascend from those functions we 
share with plants, to those we share with animals, to those that 
are distinctively human. Descartes certainly thinks that 
distinctively human capacities require the postulation of a 
separate soul, but the postulation of a hierarchy of souls-and 
more specifically, the postulation of a 'sensitive soul' to account 
for animal sentience-is a different matter. First, it is 
unnecessary, since one can, Descartes believes, explain vegetable 
and animal capacities simply in tenns of matter. Second, the 
postulation of a hierarchy of souls does not actually explain 
anything: it does nothing more than label the stages at which 
various differences are considered to emerge, while giving the 
impression that the cause of the difference has been identified. 
Third, a hierarchy of souls obscures the all-important distinction 
between the soul and the body, suggesting that the differences 
may be ones of degree, something that Descartes singles out for 
criticism in his theory of the passions. 
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The third case, that of the apparent goal-directedness of certain 
physiological processes, is the most serious challenge to a 
mechanist physiology, and the cases of the development of the 
foetus and perceptual cognition are the most problematic kinds 
of case for a mechanist account. Descartes deals with both in 
some detail. His account of embryology is radically revisionary 
and effectively eliminates any element of goal-directedness in 
foetal development. His account of perceptual cognition, on the 
other hand, aims to 'save the appearances' to a large extent, and 
is reductionist, in that nothing other than mechanical processes 
are involved; but these mechanical processes have a level of 
structuring imposed upon them that allows for recognitional 
capacities, something which Descartes shows, at least at an 
elementary level, not to be beyond the capabilities of a mechanist 
theory. The aim is to show how function can be generated purely 
within the resources of mechanism. 
It is important, in considering these matters, to understand in 
what the novelty of Descartes' attempt to mechanise physiology 
lay. It did not lie in construing psycho-physiological functions 
corporeally. Many psycho-physiological functions had been 
construed corporeally before Descartes by writers on physiology, 
and indeed there had been an extensive concern from Galen 
onwards with the localisation of particular faculties in the brain. 
There was even an orthodox tradition, dating back to the Church 
Fathers, of construing thought in corporeal terms, a tradition 
which the 'theologians and philosophers' who compiled the sixth 
set of objections to Descartes' Meditationes describe explicitly 
and approvingly as the 'soul thinking ... by means of corporeal 
motions' .6 Descartes' aim was to show that a number of psycho-
physiological functions that had traditionally been recognised 
as being corporeal could be accounted for in a way that did not 
render matter sentient. That is the novel part of the programme. 
What is original about Descartes' project is not that it construes 
the faculties in corporeal terms, but his attempt to show that 
construing them in corporeal terms did not contradict the central 
tenet of mechanism that matter was inert. 
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Finally, in this section, it is worth asking just what picture 
of biological entities emerges from the more revisionary aspects 
of Cartesian mechanist physiology. Descartes speaks of animals 
as 'automata', a term that also covers human bodies when not 
considered as animated by a soul. The terminology is misleading, 
however, for in the seventeenth century it meant little more than 
a 'self-moving thing'. Leibniz, defending his claim that we 
possess 'freedom of spontaneity', speaks of the human soul as a 
'kind of spiritual automaton', meaning no more than that its 
action-generating impulses arise solely ad interno, and produce 
effects without the intervention of any external cause. Indeed, 
the terminology of machines, which carries with it the strongest 
connotations for our understanding of what a mechanistically-
construed animal might be like, is also somewhat misleading 
here. We tend to think of seventeenth-century machines as rigid 
wooden and metal clockwork constructions, like the famous 
Strasbourg clock. On this conception, 'animal machines' come 
out looking like the metal robots of twentieth-century 
imagination. But the machines that Descartes takes as his model 
are hydraulically-powered statues and mechanically-driven 
fountains: the kinds of devices he describes in L'Homme 
resemble, and probably derive from, the hydraulically-powered 
devices in the underground grottoes at the Saint-Germain gardens, 
which Descartes was certainly familiar with from illustrations, 
and which he may well have known at first hand. He mentions 
the analogy with clocks in the Discours de La methode,? but 
there is no evidence that clocks ever formed a model for a 
mechanistic physiology. Just as in Le Monde, where bodies are 
carried along in fluids, so in L'Homme the kind of image 
Descartes' model conveys is that of fluids being pushed through 
tubes, not wheels working cogs, and this has a much more 
intuitively 'organic' feel to it. The difference between an animal 
so traditionally conceived and a Cartesian automaton is not a 
difference between soft, fleshy organic entities and clockwork 
robots, but a conceptual difference between how physiological 
processes are to be modelled. 
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Perceptual Cognition 
Let us tum then to perceptual cognition. Descartes has a specific 
quarrel with the attempt to treat perception as a goal-directed 
process. It is not just that thinking of goals gets us nowhere. 
Rather, trying to think through perception in terms of its goals 
points us in a direction that is demonstrably wrong. Aristotle 
had maintained that we have the sense organs we do have because 
they naturally display to us the nature of the world, and his 
account of the optics and physiology of perception turned around 
what he took its function to be. Among other things, the optics 
and physiology had to be construed in such a way as to yield 
perceptual images that resembled what was perceived. The optics 
and physiology that Aristotle's account yielded turned out to be 
completely wrong, however, as Descartes knew, and his own 
account of perception, in the Regulae for example,8 starts from 
a new understanding of the optics and physiology of vision and 
uses this understanding to explore what form visual cognition 
might take. 
Visual cognition involves cognitive response. This isn't a 
problem for an account that construes the sense organs primarily 
in terms of their function, that subordinates structure to function, 
as Aristotle's account did. Descartes wants to subordinate 
function to structure, he wants there to be nothing more to 
function than what an examination of structure reveals. The 
problem in perceptual cognition is to recognise the goal-
directedness of perceptual cognition-the goal is cognition, the 
means perception-without rendering this a teleological process. 
It is basically the problem of capturing the idea of realising a 
function without the Aristotelian/scholastic notion of intrinsic 
final ends. 
The faculties involved in perceptual cognition-the 'external' 
sense organs, the common sense, the memory, and the 
imagination-traditionally had been constructed in corporeal 
terms, with a good deal of attention having been given to 
localisation of faculties in the brain by physiologists. But the 
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construal of some level of cognitive functioning in corporeal 
terms had been associated with various attempts to render matter 
itself sentient, by invoking the idea of a 'sensitive soul' regulating 
the corporeal process from inside. To the extent that he is 
concerned to show that organic processes, including some 
cognitive operations, can be construed wholly mechanistically, 
Descartes has to make sure that his account is compatible with 
the inertness of matter. His aim is to show that the structure and 
behaviour of bodies are to be explained in the same way that we 
explain the structure and behaviour of machines, and in doing 
this he wants to show how a form of genuine cognition occurs in 
animals and that this can be captured in mechanistic terms. He 
does not want to show that cognition does not occur at all, that 
instead of a cognitive process we have a merely mechanical one. 
The aim is to explain animal cognition, not to explain it away. 
Take the case of visual cognition. We can distinguish between 
mere response to a visual stimulus, in which the parts of the 
automaton simply react in a fixed way; visual awareness, in 
which the perceiver has a mental representation of the object or 
state of affairs that caused the visual stimulus in the first place; 
and perceptual judgement, the power to reflect on and make a 
judgement about (e.g. a judgement as to the veridicality of) 
this representation. Descartes clearly restricts the last to human 
beings-it requires the possession of a mind/rational soul. Which 
of the first two are we to attribute to animals on Descartes' 
account? The automaton could react directly to the corpuscular 
action that makes up light without actually seeing anything, as a 
genuine machine might, but this is not how Descartes describes 
the visual process in automata in L'Homme. He tells us, for 
example, that the 'figures traced in the spirits on the [pineal] 
gland, where the seat of imagination and common sense is, should 
be taken to be ideas, that is, to be the forms or images that the 
rational soul will consider directly when, being united to this 
machine, it will imagine or will sense any object' . This indicates 
that there are representations on the pineal gland of the 
automaton. It is in fact difficult to see how they could not have 
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'mental' representations if we are to talk about visual cognition. 
And it makes no sense to talk about their having representations 
but not being aware of the content of these representations. 
Moreover, Descartes certainly does not deny states such as 
memory to animals, and remembering something is just about 
the paradigm case of grasping the content of a representation. 
The problem is, that while Descartes can allow that automata 
have representations, it is not immediately clear how he can 
allow that they grasp the content of these representations if they 
are not aware of them as representations: if, unlike human beings, 
they cannot make judgements about them as representations, 
e.g. about their veridicality. 
In what sense can automata be aware of the content of 
representations without being able to respond to them as 
representations? Descartes' problem might be put in these terms. 
The behaviour of automata is such that they must be construed 
as responding to perceptual and other cognitive stimuli in a 
genuinely cognitive way, that is in a way that simply goes beyond 
a stimUlus-response arc. In other words, their behaviour indicates 
that they are sentient. But they are not conscious: that is, they 
have no awareness of their own cognitive states as such and so 
cannot make judgements as to their content. Consequently, 
Descartes has to account for the behaviour of sentient but non-
conscious automata. Because automata are literally 'mindless', 
this can only be done in terms of a mechanistic physiology. 
What we need to do is to capture the difference between 
sentient and non-sentient behaviour, and to set out how this is 
reflected in differences at the level of a mechanistic physiology. 
My account of Descartes on this issue is largely a reconstruction 
of what kind of response was available to him on the basis of 
some very inconclusive remarks that he makes, but I believe that 
it does represent a strategy that is consonant with his general 
approach. 
The first question, the difference between sentience and non-
sentience, is of course a grey area, but one crucial difference we 
might point to is that there is a sense in which sentient beings are 
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able to process information: they are able to interpret stimuli, 
and this interpretation determines their response. Descartes gives 
us some hints as to how this difference might be manifested in 
Chapter I of Le Monde, for not only is it established there that 
there is a certain level of processing of visual information that 
requires nothing over and above corporeal organs, but we are 
also given some account of what such processing would consist 
of. 
In Chapter I, Descartes looks at the relation between the 
physical agitation of matter that results in a stimulation of the 
eye, and the visual cognition that we have as a result of this. 
Previously, his account had focused on getting the 'perceptual' 
part of perceptual cognition right, whereas here he concentrates 
on the 'cognition' side of the question. The account of cognition 
in the Regulae, for example, is little more than a mechanist 
reworking of medieval faculty psychology: the perceptual process 
involves stimulation of the external sense organ, which in tum 
conveys motions or 'agitations' to the common sense, and then 
to the memory and finally to the imagination. The account 
presented in the first chapter of Le Monde is different. Perceptual 
cognition is not thought of in causal terms, and it is not thought 
of as a multi-stage process. Rather, the treatment focuses on the 
question of how we are able to respond to certain properties or 
events as information. 
In that chapter Descartes suggests that we conceive of visual 
cognition, not in terms of the mechanical-causal process involved 
in perception, but in terms of a single unified act of 
comprehension. He spells this out in terms of a new linguistic 
model of perception: 
Words, as you well know, bear no resemblance to the things 
they signify, and yet they make us think of these things, frequently 
even without our paying attention to the sound of the words or 
to their syllables. Thus it may happen that we hear an utterance 
whose meaning we understand perfectly well, but afterwards we 
cannot say in what language it was spoken. Now if words, which 
signify nothing except by human convention, suffice to make us 
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think of things to which they bear no resemblance, then why 
should nature not also have established some sign which would 
make us have the sensation of light, even if the sign contained 
nothing in itself which is similar to this sensation? Is it not thus 
that nature has established laughter and tears, to make us read 
joy and sadness on the faces of men?9 
If we distinguish between the question of how perceptual 
information is conveyed and the question of how perceptual 
information is represented, then we can see that Descartes is 
retaining a causal-mechanical model for the first, and advocating 
a linguistic model for the second. On the linguistic model, we 
grasp an idea by virtue of a sign which represents that idea to us. 
So, in the case of a conventional linguistic sign, when we know 
English, the word 'dog' conveys to us the idea of a dog. And 
just as conventional signs do not resemble what they signify, so 
too natural signs do not resemble what they signify either. 
Descartes tells us that there is in nature a sign which is responsible 
for our sensation of light but which is not itself light, and which 
does not resemble light. All there is in nature is motion. In the 
case of a natural sign like motion of a particular kind, provided 
we have the ability to recognise and interpret it, when we grasp 
motion of that kind what it will convey to us is light. Light is 
what we will experience when we respond in the appropriate 
way to the sign. As examples of natural signs, Descartes tells us 
that tears are a natural sign of sadness and laughter a natural 
sign of joy. One of the things that distinguishes signs from causes 
is that whether a sign signifies something to us-that is, whether 
we can call it a sign in the first place-depends on our ability to 
recognise and interpret the sign, and it is this ability on our part 
that makes the signs what they are. Causation is clearly different 
from this, for causes do not depend in any way upon our ability 
to recognise them. The question is, what makes natural signs 
signs? It cannot be, or cannot merely be, something in nature, 
for something cannot be a sign for us unless we can recognise it, 
so it must be something in us that makes tears, or laughter, or a 
particular kind of motion, signs. This something in us must be 
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an acquired or an innate capacity; and Descartes' view is that it 
is an innate capacity which, it will tum out, God has provided us 
with. There would be no natural signs unless we had the capacity 
to recognise them as such. 
Here, I suggest, we have the two key pieces in the account of 
sentience. Sentient responses are different from non-sentient 
responses in that in the latter case we can give a full account 
merely by showing the causal-mechanical processes involved. 
In the case of sentient responses this will not tell us everything 
we need to know, and we need to supplement it with a different 
kind of account. There is an element of reciprocity in perceptual 
cognition as linguistically modelled that we do not find in 
the causal-mechanical account. The linguistic model enables us 
to grasp what perceptual understanding consists in, whereas 
the causal-mechanical account describes what physical-
cum-physiological processes must occur if this understanding 
is to take place. This is the core difference between sentience 
and non-sentience. The next question is whether such a fonn 
of interpretation modelled on language is realisable in a 
mechanistic physiology alone. What is needed over and above 
the causal-mechanical account that we provide of non-sentient 
responses? Above all, what we need is some means of forming 
representations in response to perceptual stimuli, and we need 
some means of storing and recalling these representations. In 
one sense, many automata-those to which we are inclined to 
ascribe some kind of sophistication in perceptual cognition, such 
as higher mammals--clearly have the physiological means to 
do this: they have pineal glands, which is where perceptual 
representations are formed, and they have memories, i.e. 
corporeal means of storage of representations. Note, in particular, 
that straightforward stimulus-response behaviour does not 
involve representation and so does not involve the pineal gland: 
in Descartes' account of the reflex arc in L'Homme, the arc 
bypasses the pineal gland, travelling instead in the brain, through 
what he tenns a 'cavity', which is almost certainly one of the 
cerebral ventricles. 
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But Descartes needs to say more than this, and it is in his 
tantalisingly brief account of light in the first chapter of Le 
Monde that he gives his indication of what this more might be. 
Remember that we are told that light is not the stimulus but the 
response to the stimulus. The stimulus is a particular kind of 
motion in the smallest kind of matter which is transmitted via 
the second matter. Note also that in order to respond to this 
particular kind of motion by perceiving light, we have to be able 
to respond in the right way (this is what makes this a significatory 
event as well as a causal one). To be able to respond in the right 
way, we need some kind of innate or built-in capacity. Here the 
question arises of whether such innate capacities are part of our 
corporeal organs or of our minds. One only has to note the fact 
that automata are able to see, that is to perceive light, whereas 
disembodied minds (souls in heaven, or whatever) are not, to 
recognise that the capacity to grasp various kinds of translational 
and rotary motion as light must naturally reside in corporeal 
organs. Descartes never suggests that automata cannot respond 
to natural signs; indeed, such functions as nutrition in higher 
animals, where the appropriate kind of food has to be sought out 
visually or olfactorily, clearly require such recognitional 
capacities. Indeed, more generally, it is difficult to explain how 
animal instincts are to be accounted for if not in terms of some 
innate capacity. 
In more modem terms, what we need is 'hard wiring'. The 
brain needs to be fitted out so as to respond in the appropriate 
way. The hard wiring makes sure you get the right kind of 
representations: that you see light, that is, have a visual image 
which displays shapes and perhaps colours, when stimulated in 
the requisite way. It is not something in nature that causes us to 
have visual images, it is a combination of a stimulation produced 
by nature and certain features of an animal's physiology which 
results in a particular kind of representation, a visual perception. 
This is clearly different from what happens when an act of 
perceptual judgement is made, but is it so different from what 
happens when, say, a plant bends towards the light, or the foetus 
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develops into a fully formed member of the species, which are 
similar kinds of process on Descartes' account? 
I think the difference might be characterised in this way. In 
the case of embryology, Descartes effectively denies that a 
functional understanding of the development of the foetus, for 
example, one that says that the foetus develops in the way it 
does so that it can become an adult of the species, tells us anything 
at all, and he replaces it with a mechanical-causal story. In the 
case of perceptual cognition in automata, he does not deny that 
there is a functional story to be told, but rather indicates how the 
functional story can be translated into the terms of a mechanistic 
psychology without losing the key insight that perception of x 
by y involves x meaning something to y, so that, for example, y 
perceives x as a lion. What is needed is the capacity to translate 
the visual stimulation, which might be characterised as agitation 
of the corpuscles making up the retina, into the requisite 
perceptual representation, that is, one that conveys the idea of a 
lion. This can be achieved by the requisite organs in the brain. 
Conclusion 
In his embryology, Descartes does not deny that there is a 
question as to why its constituent matter behaves in such a way 
that the foetus develops into an adult of a particular species. 
What he is saying is that the explanation for that is not something 
internal to the development of the foetus but external to it. God 
made it so, and God is the only final cause. What Descartes is 
concerned with is internal causes. The same holds for his account 
of perceptual cognition. Descartes does not deny that God has 
given automata the sense organs they have so that they might 
sustain themselves in the world. It is just that the question of 
how the sense organs operate, which is what he is concerned 
with, is different from why they operate in that way: indeed, on 
Descartes' account, these are completely different questions. 
However, when the body is considered, no longer as the body 
of an animal or an homme machine, but as part of what Descartes 
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will refer to as 'the substantial union of mind and body' , intrinsic 
goals re-enter the picture. Human beings are able to reflect upon 
and make judgements about the content of their perceptual 
representations, and the nature of perception is transformed as a 
result. Unlike the perceptual cognition of an automaton, such as 
a dog or a bat or an earthworm, which has no intrinsic goals, 
human perception must be considered in terms of a goal, the 
goal of understanding the world, and it can be criticised, for 
example, to the extent to which it fails to achieve that goal. 
Intrinsic goals enter the picture because of the presence of a 
conscious intelligence, and that, on Descartes' account, is their 
proper place. 
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